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Abstract
This paper shows that Turkish manufacturing exporters export goods that they have not pro-
duced and thus also act as trade intermediaries. This exporting of “sourced” products is ubiquitous
across firms, products, and destinations. Beyond these facts, the main contribution of the paper is to
show that sourced exports are more sensitive to gravity determinants than produced exports at the
aggregate level, but at the firm level, this relationship is reversed. We rationalize these findings by
allowing producers to act as intermediaries in a model where profitability at the product-destination
level is stochastic and correlated across markets. We provide empirical evidence for the model’s
core mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Selling to foreign markets is characterized by many hurdles compared to domestic trade. As a result, a
substantial part of aggregate trade is done by professional intermediaries: firms specialized in trading
that do not produce goods themselves. However, Bernard et al. (2019) have shown that, in Belgium,
many manufacturing exporters also export goods that they do not produce. They show suggestive
evidence that demand-scope complementarities may be an important driver of this trade, referring to
it as “carry-along trade” (CAT).1
In this paper, we first confirm the prevalence of manufacturers exporting goods that are sourced
from other producers, using firm-product level data from Turkey for 2005-14. We find that 88% of
manufacturing exporters export goods that they do not produce, and 97% of the products are exported
by at least one firm that is not producing it. This trade represents 40% to 45% of aggregate exports by
manufacturers in value. Taking this form of intermediation into account more than doubles the amount
of aggregate trade that is intermediated. Moreover, using the geographic dimension of the data, we
show that almost half of these sourced exports are purely intermediated : to many destinations, firms
sell sourced products only. Beyond documenting these stylized facts, the main contribution of this
paper is to show that this trade behaves differently and thus matters for our understanding of trade
patterns. We empirically show that sourced exports react differently to gravity determinants, and we
develop a model that is able to rationalize these patterns.
We start by comparing aggregate flows of produced and sourced exports for the same product-
destination combinations, and show that sourced exports are more sensitive to gravity determinants
than produced exports.2 We find that this larger reaction is entirely driven by the extensive margin.
This implies that trade of sourced products does not mimic the one of produced products and thus
matters for trade patterns.3 To understand the source of this result, we turn to firm-level flows.
Hence, we compare exports of sourced and produced goods at the firm-product-destination level, and
find that exports of sourced products react relatively less to gravity determinants, conditional on
exporting. Together with the result on aggregate flows, this finding indicates that while the firm-level
exports of sourced products decline relatively less when selling to smaller and more distant markets,
these firm-product lines exit relatively more as the markets become more difficult to reach. We refer
to this pattern of elasticities as “elasticity divergence.”
The elasticity divergence we find is puzzling for three reasons. First, in most, if not all trade
models, firms’ decisions of entry and exit are driven by sales and profits. If firm-level sales are less
sensitive to trade costs, so should be the entry and exit decisions. Second, produced and sourced
products are exported by the same manufacturers. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the ex-
1They document that almost 90% of exporters engage in CAT, making up around 30% of Belgium’s aggregate exports
in 2005.
2While this also holds for GDP and distance, we compute measures of market access and trade freeness as theoretically
robust gravity determinants following Head and Mayer (2014).
3We show in the last part of the paper that this trade is also different than the one of professional (non-manufacturing)
intermediaries.
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port technology/information set is the same for both types of flows, in contrast to the traditional
explanation for the different behavior of professional intermediaries. Third, when we focus on purely
intermediated flows, which make up around half of sourced exports, the pattern of elasticities we find
remains. This implies that this elasticity divergence cannot be explained solely by carry-along trade.
Yet, this result suggests that the causality from profits to the export decision may not be as direct as
usually seen in the literature. To explain it, we need to think about selection in export markets in a
new way.
In the second part of the paper, we develop a trade model to rationalize our empirical findings.
Beyond allowing producers to act as intermediaries, the key novel feature of the model is that firm-
product profitability in each destination is stochastic, with shocks that are correlated across markets,
affecting the pattern of entry and exit. We show how these correlated stochastic shocks can generate
the pattern of elasticities described above, without assuming a different technology of exporting or
complementarities between exported products. Furthermore, the presence of purely intermediated
flows arises naturally in this setup.
Our baseline is a standard model of international trade with CES monopolistic competition and
heterogeneous firms. As in the literature, only the best firms choose to pay the sunk cost of exporting.
To allow trade intermediation by producers, we let domestic firms to choose to pay a sunk cost to
match with one of these exporters and utilize their export network. They can then sell indirectly to
foreign markets and share the profits with the (actual) exporter. Importantly, we assume that all firms
are endowed with an idiosyncratic distribution from which they draw their profitability parameter for
each market they want to serve. It follows that profitability in each destination is stochastic and
correlated across markets.4 We further assume that these distributions can be ranked in terms of
hazard rate order.5 Firms with a higher rank (i.e. better distributions) have larger expected profits
and will thus pay the sunk cost of exporting by themselves.6 Firms with lower ranks may choose
to use the export network of these exporters to export indirectly. In this case, they still draw their
market specific profitability parameter from their own distribution.
As firms move to smaller and more distant markets, expected sales are lower and so is the proba-
bility of exporting, for all firms. However, this effect is stronger for exports of sourced products, as a
direct consequence of their lower rank in terms of hazard rate. Their sales elasticity, unconditional on
exporting, is thus larger because they tend to exit more as markets get more difficult to reach. This
in turn generates a larger aggregate elasticity for sourced exports, as in the data. Second, conditional
on exporting, the expected profitability parameter will be higher for all firms: the subset of firms
that are still able to export will be those with good enough draws. Therefore, the elasticity of their
sales, conditional on exporting, is lower than in the standard model. We show that the difference
4Several papers have introduced i.i.d. stochastic shocks to sales and profits in export markets; see for example Bernard
et al. (2011) and Eaton et al. (2011). We are not aware of contributions where these shocks are correlated.
5Hazard rate stochastic ordering has been used in the trade literature by Demidova (2008). Whereas she applies it
to the distribution of firms across countries, we apply it within firms across destinations.
6Note that a higher rank distribution also implies a lower variance in these shocks. Thus, intuitively, a higher rank
means both a better and a less risky prospect. We will use this property to empirically test the model’s mechanism.
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between the elasticity of exporting conditional versus unconditional on exporting, increases for firms
with lower rank, inducing the elasticity divergence we document. Finally, we provide an empirical test
of the mechanism put forward in our model. We verify that, in each market, exports of sourced prod-
ucts at the firm-level have a lower mean and a larger variance, which is key to explain the elasticity
divergence we find in the data. Overall, our results point to a subtle selection process of firm-varieties
within products that affects the behavior of aggregate trade patterns.
In the last part of the paper, we relate our findings to the existing literature. First, we address
the role of complementarities between exports of sourced and produced products. While our model
does not feature any complementarity, it does not mean that they are absent in the data. Here,
we use our decomposition of exports of sourced products into purely intermediated (PI) and CAT
flows (i.e. those that are bundled with produced products). We find that, across products and
destinations, CAT flows are smaller than PI flows on average. This stylized fact indicates that these
complementarities exist and thus could be another motive for trade intermediation by producers.
Second, the prevalence of PI flows suggests that an important reason for sourced exporting is gains
from intermediation only. Hence, we compare the trade of sourced and produced products with the
one of professional (non-manufacturing) intermediaries. We find that professional intermediaries react
differently to market access, and we interpret this result as suggestive evidence that these firms have
a comparative advantage in exporting (based on superior market knowledge or technology) compared
to producers.
Our paper is primarily related to the nascent literature initiated by Bernard et al. (2019), who
document the prevalence of sourced exports by manufacturers. They show that the number of sourced
products exported increase more than proportionally with firm productivity, and provide suggestive
evidence for demand complementarities between produced and sourced exports. In contrast, we use the
geographical dimension of the data to decompose sourced exports into their CAT and PI components,
showing that intermediation is another important reason for these exports. Accessing international
markets thus generates gains for manufacturers beyond the benefits of having access to a larger market
for their own products. This decomposition also allows us to ensure that the pattern of elasticities
we find is not driven by complementarities between produced and sourced exports. Other papers that
document the prevalence of sourced exporting include Di Nino (2015) for Italy, van den Berg et al.
(2019) for the Netherlands, Abreha et al. (2020) for Denmark, and Arnarson (2020) for Sweden.
The literature on sourced exporting indicates that we should think about multi-product firms in
a new way. As Bernard et al. (2019), we find that the majority of the “superstar” firms’ exported
products are sourced from other firms. This sharply contrasts with the approach first developed in the
literature, which assumed that firms produce a set of products and export a subset of them (e.g. Eckel
and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2014). Recently, Eckel and Riezman (2020) discuss
the implications of CAT for firms, and study the strategic choice by a firm to export its product alone
directly or indirectly, bundling its product with another one. We, on the other hand, contribute to
this literature by modeling sourced exports as trade intermediation by producers, to explain also the
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purely intermediated part of sourced exports.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on trade intermediation. Some papers have compared
the reaction of exports by professional intermediaries versus manufacturers to gravity determinants
(e.g. Bernard et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Crozet et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2015; Akerman, 2018).
These papers show that intermediaries enable less productive firms to export indirectly. Moreover,
intermediaries help firms to reach less accessible markets, implying that trade intermediation by pro-
fessional intermediaries (TII) is more prevalent in markets that are more difficult to access. The
explanation for these results is that intermediaries have a comparative advantage in exporting due to,
for example, economies of scope or superior knowledge of foreign markets. In relation to this litera-
ture, we also find that trade intermediation by producers (TIP) facilitates exports of less profitable
products.7 However, our analysis shows that TIP is more concentrated in easily accessible markets,
as opposed to what has been found for TII. When we take TIP and TII together, we find that inter-
mediated trade is actually more concentrated in large and close-by markets. From a theoretical point
of view, we do not introduce any superior export technology but assume that there is a cost to match
with another firm that is providing an export network. As such, the way we see TIP is closer to the
earlier literature on intermediaries that view them as “match-makers” (e.g. Rauch and Watson, 2004;
Antràs and Costinot, 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, paying special attention
to the prevalence of PI flows. Section 3 illustrates the elasticity divergence between sourced and
produced exports focusing on aggregate and firm-level regressions. In Section 4, we develop a model
that is able to generate the empirical patterns we find. In Section 5, we relate our findings to the
literature by first comparing PI and CAT flows of sourced products, and then comparing TIP to TII.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses further research.
2 Data
We use three main databases from Turkey in this paper: the first is the Industry Production Statistics
database that is available for 2005-14 and provides the volume and value of production and sales of
each product that is produced by a firm.8 Products are classified according to the 10-digit PRODTR
classification of which the first 8-digits correspond to the EU’s official production classification PROD-
COM (production communautaire).9 All PRODTR are concorded overtime by the Turkish Statistical
Institute (TÜİK) to the 2010 classification for consistency. The second dataset is the Industry and
Services Statistics database that includes annual statistics such as total sales, number of employees,
7In this paper, we use trade intermediation by producers (TIP) and sourced exporting interchangeably.
8This dataset has been used for example by Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016), Javorcik et al. (2018), and Erbahar
(2020).
9The first 6- and 4-digits of PRODCOM correspond to the CPA (classification of products by activity) and the NACE
(nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne) Revision 2 classifications.
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wages, expenses, and investment for all firms that have at least 20 employees for 2003-14.10
The third dataset we use is the Foreign Trade Statistics database which reports exports and imports
of each firm annually for 2002-14. Exports and imports are classified by firm-country-GTIP (Gümrük
Tarife İstatistik Pozisyonu), where GTIP is a 12-digit product code whose first 8-digits correspond
to the EU’s Combined Nomenclature (CN) and the first 6-digits correspond to the internationally
standardized Harmonized Schedule (HS). Since the PRODTR-GTIP concordance table provided by
TÜİK is for 2010, the descriptive cross-sectional analysis in this paper uses 2010 as the benchmark
year. However, we take advantage of the time dimension in the empirical analysis, and for that
we concord the trade data overtime to the HS2007 nomenclature, using Pierce and Schott’s (2012)
algorithm combined with HS correlation tables from the UN Statistics Division.11
In order to match production data with the trade data, we apply the algorithm developed by
Van Beveren et al. (2012) to the PRODTR-GTIP correspondence tables provided by TÜİK at the
HS6 level and create uniform HS6+ codes. These are codes that match one-to-one to HS6 codes
as well as codes that include multiple HS6 codes to fix the issue of one-to-many and many-to-many
PRODTR-HS6 matches (see Appendix Table B.2 for an example). The merge results in 2,610 HS6+
products as opposed to 5,052 HS6 products in 2010.12 This matching at the HS6+ level enables us
to classify firm-products as produced versus sourced. Note that this level of aggregation results in a
conservative definition of “sourced,” since there might still be a subset of products within an HS6+
that are not produced by the firm. In our empirical analysis in Section 3, we switch back to the HS6
level to exploit all the variation in the trade data, and use the 4,558 manufacturing product categories
that are classified as either produced or sourced at the firm-HS6+ level.
We merge the Industry and Services Statistics database with Industry Production Statistics, keep-
ing manufacturing firms only. Then, we follow Erbahar’s (2020) data cleaning procedures and restrict
the sample to firms with at least 20 employees, and drop observations where exports are larger than
total sales, or where production sales are larger than total sales. Finally, we keep firms that have
produced and exported at least one manufacturing good in 2005-14. This results in a sample of 23,296
firms, covering around half of manufacturing exports and two-thirds of manufacturing production. In
part of our empirical analysis, we add exports done by professional intermediaries which make up
about 11%-18% of manufacturing exports.13
2.1 Prevalence of sourced exporting by producers
We first confirm some of the findings of Bernard et al. (2019) for Belgian firms by illustrating the
prevalence of sourced exporting by Turkish firms. In the next subsection, we provide new stylized
10The database also includes a representative sample of firms that have less than 20 employees, but the identity of
these firms change every year, and thus we exclude them from our analysis.
11The time period we analyze covers three different nomenclatures, and thus we only need to concord products classified
at the HS2002 and HS2012 nomenclatures to the HS2007 nomenclature.
12With the overtime concordance, the number of HS6+ codes is 2,572.
13We classify firms as professional intermediaries if their self-reported NACE Revision 2 sector code falls into the
“Wholesale and retail trade” category (divisions 45-47).
6
facts on trade intermediation by producers (TIP) by decomposing sourced exports into two parts:
one where sourced products are exported together with produced goods (CAT), and the other purely
intermediated (PI) part where sourced products are exported by themselves.
Table 1 sorts manufacturing exporters by the number of HS6+ products they exported in 2010.
As expected, the number of exporters (column 3) quickly declines as the number of products exported
increases. Importantly, the number of exported products is lower than the average number of produced
products (column 2) for single-product exporters only. For multi-product exporters (i.e. exporting
more than one product), the number of exported products always exceeds the average number of pro-
duced products. This feature becomes striking for the largest multi-product exporters. For example,
the average number of produced products for “superstar” firms that exported more than 50 products
is only 3.8. This reveals that the multi-product nature of exporters is largely driven by firms selling
products that are sourced from other producers.





















> 50 3.79 234
Notes: Summary statistics are based on the 8,434 manufacturing ex-
porters in 2010. Products are based on the HS6+ classification, with
maximum number of exported products 394.
Sourced exports also appear at higher levels of aggregation, dispelling the concern that our findings
might be due to misclassification of product codes or inaccurate concordance procedures. Table 2
compares summary statistics in 2010 for manufacturing exporters at the HS6+ level, and at the more
aggregate HS4+ and HS2+ levels. At the HS6+ level, the average firm produces 2.3 products, but
exports 10.1 products due to sourced exports. The average number of exported sourced products is
8.9. These statistics are lower at more aggregate levels, but the average number of exported products
stays larger than the number of produced products. Here, we compare the HS6+ and HS2+ results,
the HS4+ results being a midway between the two aggregations. Referring to HS6+ as products and
HS2+ as sectors, Table 2 highlights that even though the average firm produces multiple products, it
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is a single-sector firm. However, even at the sector level, the median firm engages in sourced exporting,
and the average number of sourced sectors is 2.6.
Table 2: Summary statistics at the firm-product level
(a) HS6+ (b) HS4+ (c) HS2+
Variable Median Mean Sd. Median Mean Sd. Median Mean Sd.
# of produced products 1 2.34 2.35 1 1.98 1.77 1 1.34 0.72
# of exported products 4 10.05 19.64 3 7.40 12.43 2 3.72 4.08
# of exported sourced products 3 8.89 19.28 2 6.19 12.15 1 2.64 3.94
Notes: Summary statistics are based on the 8,434 manufacturing exporters in 2010.
In addition to the statistics above, we find that, in 2010, 88% of manufacturing exporters exported
at least one HS6+ that they did not produce, the average share of sourced exports in a firm’s total
exports was 55%, and the average share of goods that were sourced in a firm’s export product basket
was 74%. Sourced exporting is also not product specific: 97% of HS6+ products were exported by at
least one firm that did not produce that good in 2010.
One might be concerned that firms that engage in sourced exporting are re-exporters (firms that
export imported goods). We match firms’ imports and exports at the product level, and find that
the median exporter does not engage in re-exporting, and re-exports make up, on average, 11% of a
firm’s sourced exports, implying that it cannot explain the widespread sourced exporting that is done
by the large majority of exporters.
Overall, our findings show that sourced exporting is prevalent for almost all firms and products.
Appendix Table B.1 lists a few examples of firms that are engaged in sourced exporting, and suggests
that sourcing activity can be due to a wide variety of reasons including, but not limited to, demand
and supply complementarities as well as pure intermediation.
2.2 Decomposing sourced exports











where Xi is exports of firm i. We label trade intermediation by professional intermediaries as TII. As
Bernard et al. (2019), we decompose total exports by manufacturers into exports that are produced













where ih denotes a firm-product (HS6+) combination. We label trade intermediation by producers as
TIP.
Finally, taking advantage of the geographic dimension of the data, we further decompose sourced
exports into CAT exports, when they are sold to destination c along with produced exports, and PI










Table 3 shows the prevalence of sourced exports in Turkey’s aggregate exports in 2005-2014. Col-
umn 2 based on equation (2) shows that TIP made up 45% of manufacturing exports in 2010. Based
on the decomposition in equation (3), column 3 of Table 3 indicates that PI made up 43% of TIP in
2010, with a minimum of 39% in 2007 and a maximum of 53% in 2014. Note also that PI exports
are not driven by just a few specialized firms: 74% of firms exporting sourced products have at least
one destination market where they sell only sourced products. Overall, TIP made up to 35% (column
4) of exports in our sample in 2010. Notably, these figures are larger than the 22% (column 5) of
exports made up by professional intermediaries (TII) in 2010. Taking TIP into account thus more
than doubles the amount of Turkey’s exports that is intermediated.
Table 3: Aggregate statistics









2005 40.9% 43.3% 27.7% 32.3%
2006 39.8% 46.8% 27.2% 31.7%
2007 42.4% 39.0% 31.3% 26.3%
2008 40.9% 43.1% 31.1% 24.0%
2009 42.7% 40.8% 34.8% 18.3%
2010 45.0% 43.4% 35.2% 21.8%
2011 42.5% 43.4% 31.9% 24.9%
2012 43.7% 42.7% 32.3% 26.1%
2013 44.5% 48.8% 31.6% 28.9%
2014 45.4% 53.2% 31.2% 31.3%
Notes: Manu. exports refer to the exports of manufacturing firms. TIP refers to trade
intermediation by producers as defined in equation (2). TII refers to trade intermedi-
ation by professional (non-manufacturing) intermediaries as defined in equation (1).
PI refers to the purely intermediated portion of TIP as defined in equation (3). Total
exports is the sum of manufacturing and TII exports.
Note that our classification of sourced exporting relies on a firm exporting a product that it does
not produce in a given year. However, as shown by Bernard et al. (2017), partial-year effects can
confound this definition, if, for example, we classify a product as sourced when it is exported by a firm
in January 2010 even though it was produced in 2009. Moreover, firms might be exporting goods that
they produced years ago via their inventories. Similarly, PI exports are defined at a yearly level and
thus can be sensitive to the same issue. To dispel these concerns, in Appendix Table B.3, we restrict
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Table 4: Decomposing trade by sectors and destinations











IV Prepared foodstuffs 3.8% 71.9% 42.6% 60.8%
VI Chemicals 3.4% 71.2% 30.3% 60.2%
VII Plastics and rubber 6.0% 89.4% 28.6% 52.9%
VIII Leather goods 0.5% 68.8% 25.5% 32.9%
IX-X Wood and wood products 1.3% 77.9% 51.0% 71.0%




3.4% 69.8% 35.6% 71.1%
XV Metals 18.3% 76.3% 51.0% 63.2%
XVI Machinery 18.3% 70.5% 45.6% 36.4%
XVII Vehicles 16.2% 99.2% 45.3% 28.0%




1.6% 67.8% 39.5% 36.5%
I-III, V, XIX Other sectors 11.7% 87.2% 10.4% 66.9%









East Asia and Pacific 4.5% 81.5% 24.7% 60.6%
Europe 57.3% 81.4% 42.6% 40.1%
Latin America and Caribbean 2.0% 73.2% 41.5% 62.4%
Middle East and North Africa 24.9% 77.8% 39.1% 55.5%
North America 4.3% 88.4% 37.4% 34.9%
South Asia 1.0% 82.5% 35.1% 72.9%
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.1% 76.9% 32.0% 72.2%
West and Central Asia 3.9% 56.4% 53.1% 50.5%
Notes: Statistics are based on Turkey’s exports of $59 billion represented by the sample of producers and interme-
diaries in our sample in 2010. TIP refers to trade intermediation by producers as defined in equation (2). PI refers
to the purely intermediated portion of TIP as defined in equation (3). Total exports is the sum of manufacturing
and professional intermediary exports. Other sectors refer to HS sections I-III, V, and XIX, which correspond
to Agriculture, Mining, and Arms respectively. Countries are allocated to regions according to the World Bank
classification.
the definition of sourced to be a product that is not produced by the firm for the entire sample period
(i.e. 2005-2014). We further conservatively classify exports into PI exports if the firm has never sold
a produced product to a destination that it serves with sourced products in 2005-2014. Even with
these restrictive definitions, TIP represents 38% of manufacturing exports, and PI makes up 28% of
TIP in 2010.
Are sourced exports, and its purely intermediated portion, specific to certain sectors or destina-
tions? Table 4 panel (a) shows the result of our decomposition by each manufacturing HS section for
2010. Column 1 shows the share of Turkey’s $59 billion total exports represented by the sample of
producers and intermediaries in our sample in 2010 made up by each HS section. Column 2 illustrates
the share of these exports that are done by producers as opposed to intermediaries, and reveals that
the majority of exports is done by manufacturers for all sections. Focusing on the four broad sectors
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that make up more than 15% of Turkish exports each (Textiles and apparel, Metals, Machinery, and
Vehicles), column 3 indicates that TIP share is fairly stable ranging from 45% for Vehicles to 51% for
Metals. The portion of TIP that is purely intermediated is shown in column 4, and ranges from 28%
for Vehicles to 63% for Metals among the top four sections. The figures show that TIP is prevalent
in all broad sectors except for Other sectors which consists of mainly non-manufacturing Agriculture,
Minerals, and Arms sectors. Column 4 indicates that PI trade makes up the majority of TIP in eight
sectors. Appendix Table B.4 panel (a) focuses on the top 10 narrower HS2 industries and finds similar
results.
Table 4 panel (b) shifts the attention to destinations. Column 3 shows that TIP share of exports
to Turkey’s top destination Europe is 43%. This figure ranges from 25% for destinations in East Asia
and Pacific to 53% in West and Central Asia. The PI shares in column 4 suggest that the majority
of TIP is explained by pure intermediation for six of the eight regions. In Appendix Table B.4 panel
(b), we look at Turkey’s top 10 destination countries and find similar results. Overall, the findings in
this section indicate that pure intermediation by producers is ubiquitous across firms, products, and
destinations.
3 Pattern of international trade and the elasticity divergence
Having shown the quantitative importance of sourced exports along several dimensions, we now char-
acterize its specific behavior. We show here that produced and sourced exports behave differently
with respect to gravity variables, which in turn means that TIP is important for our understanding
of aggregate trade patterns.
First, we follow the gravity literature (Head and Mayer, 2014) and estimate the following equation
using bilateral trade data for 228 countries and 96 HS2 sectors for 2005-2014 from the BACI database
of CEPII (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010):
XocHt = FEoHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply capacity
+ FEcHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
market capacity
+ ϵocHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
freeness of trade
(4)
where XocHt is log exports of country o to country c in HS2 sector H in year t; FEoHt and FEcHt
are fixed effects that capture the supply capacity of the origin country and the market capacity of
the destination country respectively, and ϵocHt is the error term capturing the bilateral freeness of
trade.14 Market capacity is the estimate of the multilateral resistance term for the importer at the
sector level, and freeness of trade captures all bilateral trade costs such as distance and tariffs. Our
strategy is to compare the reaction of produced and sourced flows to gravity variables. Note that in
the following, we switch from HS6+ to HS6, which allows us to compare produced and sourced flows
14Note that the sector is defined at the HS2 level even though our subsequent regressions are at the HS6 level. The
reason is that the number of zeros increases substantially as the products become more disaggregated, and the fixed effect
estimates become unstable. In Appendix Tables B.6 and B.10, we replicate our benchmark analyses using estimates at
the HS4 level, and results are qualitatively the same. Appendix Table B.9 uses GDP and distance instead of market
capacity and freeness of trade and finds qualitatively similar results.
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within the more disaggregated HS6 categories.15 Thus, we estimate the following specification where
we use market capacity and freeness of trade when the exporter o is Turkey:
Tmcht = β1Sourcedm + β2(MCcHt × Sourcedm) + β3(FTcHt × Sourcedm) + FEcht+ϵmcht (5)
where Tmcht, defined for m = {P, S} (produced, sourced), is one of three outcome variables at the
destination c, HS6 h, and year t level: log aggregate exports Xmcht, log average exports per firm
Xmcht/nomcht, and log number of exporters nomcht. Sourcedm is an indicator variable for sourced
flows, and MCcHt and FTcHt are market capacity and freeness of trade estimated from equation
(4). Note that we include destination-HS6-year fixed effects, FEcht, in specification (5), effectively
comparing two flows (produced versus sourced) of the same HS6 to the same destination in a given
year. These fixed effects also capture demand side determinants. ϵmcht is the error term, and we
cluster standard errors at the country and HS6 level to allow for correlated shocks along these two
dimensions. Note that we are interested in identifying the interaction coefficients β2 and β3, and not
the main effects of market capacity and freeness of trade, which are collinear with FEcht. Summary
statistics for the variables used in our benchmark regressions are shown in Appendix Table B.5.
Table 5 shows our results. In column 1, we use a less restrictive set of fixed effects (FEch, FEct,
FEht) to identify the main effects of market capacity and freeness of trade. Both market capacity and
freeness of trade increase exports as expected. Moreover, the interaction coefficients with the sourced
dummy are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that sourced flows are more sensitive
to gravity variables when compared to produced flows. The interaction coefficients are sizable with
respect to the main effects. The sourced dummy is also estimated precisely: sourced flows of an HS6
to a destination in a given year are on average 70% smaller than produced flows. In column 2, we add
the benchmark FEcht, and the interaction coefficients and their standard errors remain similar. In
columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we decompose aggregate exports into average exports and the number of
exporters. The estimates illustrate that the larger elasticity of sourced exports to gravity variables is
entirely driven by the extensive margin, and that the number of sourced firm-HS6 flows are on average
11% higher for a given destination-HS6-year combination.
In Appendix Table B.7 we exclude Turkey’s export destinations in its customs union partner
European Union from the sample, and find very similar results. Finally, to address the concern that
the log linear estimates of gravity equations can be biased due to heteroskedasticity, we also estimate
equation (5) using Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML). Appendix Table B.8 shows that while
the signs are still positive, we lose significance of the interaction terms when we have export values
as the dependent variable (columns 1 and 2). However, we keep finding that the number of exporters
is more sensitive to gravity variables for sourced exports, which is at the core of our theoretical
15Since we categorize a product to be produced or sourced at the more aggregate HS6+ level, our empirical analysis
at the HS6 level potentially underestimates the prevalence of sourced exporting, since an HS6+ category is classified as
produced as soon as one HS6 (within that HS6+ category) is produced. Hence, this potential measurement error works
against finding a different reaction between sourced and produced exports.
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Table 5: Aggregate results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: lnXmcht lnXmcht ln avgmcht lnnomcht
Sourcedm -0.700*** -0.786*** -0.893*** 0.108***
(0.050) (0.067) (0.055) (0.027)
MCcHt 0.334***
(0.027)
× Sourcedm 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.016 0.087***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019)
FTcHt 0.267***
(0.020)
× Sourcedm 0.108*** 0.146*** 0.018 0.128***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013)
FE ch, ct, ht cht cht cht
N 891,582 891,582 891,582 891,582
R2 0.69 0.89 0.90 0.86
Notes: lnXmcht is log export values, ln avgmcht is log average exports per firm, and lnnomcht
is the log number of exporters at the country-HS6-year (cht) level. Sourcedm is dummy
variable that indicates whether the export flow m is sourced as opposed to produced. MCcHt
and FTcHt refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year level (cHt)
respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
mechanism.16
Why are sourced exports more sensitive to gravity variables than produced exports? To understand
the source of this result, we turn to firm-level flows and estimate the following specification:
ticht = β1(MCcHt × Sourcediht) + β2(FTcHt × Sourcediht) + FEcht + FEiht + FEict + ϵicht (6)
where ticht is one of three outcome variables at the firm i, destination c, HS6 h, and year t level: firm
log export value xicht, log export quantity qicht, and log unit value uvicht. Sourcediht is an indicator
variable for sourced flows at the firm-HS6-year level. We include country-HS6-year fixed effects, FEcht,
to control for aggregate demand, firm-HS6-year fixed effects, FEiht, to control for supply side factors
such as firm-product productivity or quality, and firm-destination-year fixed effects, FEict, to control
for a firm’s network (e.g. branding/reputation). ϵicht is the error term, and we cluster standard errors
at the country and HS6 level as in specification (5). Note that the coefficients capturing the differences
in these elasticities, β2 and β3, are conditional on exporting, and thus should not be directly compared
to our estimates at the aggregate level.
Table 6 shows the estimates of equation (6). In column 1, we use a less restrictive set of fixed
16We restrict the sample to the one used in our OLS regressions with positive flows since we are interested in comparing
positive produced and sourced flows of the same product to the same country. Results are qualitatively similar when we
include zeros.
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effects to identify the main effects of market capacity and freeness of trade. As expected, both affect
firm-level exports positively, with the sourced interaction for freeness of trade estimated to be negative
and statistically significant. We also find that sourced flows are substantially lower than produced
flows as indicated by the dummy estimate. In column 2, we use the benchmark set of fixed effects and
find that the sourced interactions are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for both
market access and freeness of trade.
Table 6: Firm-level results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: lnxicht lnxicht ln qicht ln qicht lnuvicht lnuvicht
Sourcediht -1.021*** -1.204*** 0.184***
(0.059) (0.075) (0.022)
MCcHt 0.214*** 0.199*** 0.015**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.007)
× Sourcediht 0.017 -0.084*** 0.045** -0.086*** -0.028*** 0.001
(0.018) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002)
FTcHt 0.279*** 0.285*** -0.006
(0.018) (0.021) (0.006)
× Sourcediht -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.064*** -0.002 -0.001
(0.021) (0.009) (0.026) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002)









N 2,006,236 2,006,236 2,006,236 2,006,236 2,006,236 2,006,236
R2 0.44 0.96 0.57 0.97 0.75 0.99
Notes: lnxicht is export values, ln qicht is export quantities, and lnuvicht is export unit values at the
firm-country-HS6-year (icht) level. Sourcediht is a dummy variable that indicates whether the export
flow of firm i of product h in year t is sourced as opposed to produced. MCcHt and FTcHt refer
to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year (cHt) level respectively. Clustered
standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
In columns 3-4 of Table 6, we change our dependent variable to be log export quantities instead
of values, and find similar results. When we change the dependent variable to be log unit values in
columns 5-6, we find no robustly significant interaction coefficient. Overall, these results show that
sourced exports at the firm level are substantially less sensitive to gravity variables than produced
exports, and that this effect is entirely driven by the reaction of quantities. In Appendix Table B.11,
we exclude EU destinations and verify the findings of Table 6.
What drives the result that firm’ sourced exports react less to gravity variables when compared
to their produced exports? One answer might be the presence of supply and/or demand complemen-
tarities between exports of produced and sourced products, when exported to the same destinations.
To see whether this might be an explanation, we decompose sourced exports into CAT and PI as
explained in Section 2.2. Since PI flows, that are destination specific, consist solely of products that
are not produced by the firm, complementarities do not exist by definition.
Table 7 column 1 shows that both CAT and PI react less to market capacity and freeness of trade.
14
The effects are larger for PI exports. Excluding the EU in column 2, or redefining PI to be over
destinations that are ‘never’ (i.e. in 2005-2014) served by firms’ produced products in column 3, do
not change the results qualitatively. This result is remarkable as it indicates that complementarities
do not drive the lower elasticity of sourced exports at the firm level.






Dependent variable: lnxicht lnxicht lnxicht
MCcHt × CATict -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.084***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
MCcHt × PIict -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.154***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.036)
FTcHt × CATict -0.064*** -0.086*** -0.064***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009)
FTcHt × PIict -0.115*** -0.134*** -0.131***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.022)
FE cht, iht, ict cht, iht, ict cht, iht, ict
N 2,006,236 1,196,898 2,006,236
R2 0.96 0.98 0.96
Notes: lnxicht is export values at the firm-country-HS6-year (icht) level. CATict refers to
destinations where the firm has sold both produced and sourced products, and PIict refers
to destinations where the firm has sold only sourced products. MCcHt and FTcHt refer
to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year (cHt) level respectively.
Clustered standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
The aggregate and firm-level results presented so far point to a puzzle. Aggregate results show
that the elasticity of sourced exports, due to the firm extensive margin, is significantly higher when
compared to the elasticity of produced exports. On the other hand, the elasticity of sourced export
quantities at the firm level is substantially lower than the one for produced export quantities. This
divergence hints that selection plays a key role in explaining the pattern of elasticities, which is hard to
reconcile with standard trade models. Indeed, if indirect exports are less sensitive at the firm level, why
would these firms’ entry/exit patterns be more sensitive? In virtually all trade models, profitability
determines entry. To explain the pattern we find, we need either a factor that affects profitability
and entry in opposite ways, or the fact that successful entry affects (observed) profitability. This
later possibility is at the core of the model we present in the next section to rationalize our empirical
findings.
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4 A model of trade intermediation by producers
In this section, we develop a simple model of international trade where we allow trade intermediation
by producers. The main objective is to show how we can generate the pattern of elasticities we uncover
in the previous section.
We consider a standard trade model with CES monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms.
The world consists of C countries. We index firms by i, destination countries by c, and (HS6) products
by h. As in the literature, only the best firms will serve (some) foreign markets. In addition, we allow
them to also serve as intermediaries for less efficient firms (i.e. allowing those to export indirectly).
The key change compared to the standard framework is the way we define the best firms. They will
be so in a stochastic sense. We first describe the demand side before coming to this feature. We then
show how the model predicts the pattern of elasticities found in the data.
4.1 Demand side













with Ωh the set of varieties of product h, cich the consumption level of each variety, aich is a preference
parameter, and
∑
h µh = 1. Note that we do not preclude firms to sell more than one variety of
product h, but we assume that firms are too small to take into account the impact of their decision







with Ech the expenditure for product h in country c, pich the price paid by consumers in the destination







the perfect price index of sector h in country c. In the
standard model, firms are usually endowed with a given productivity/quality parameter (exogenously
or as a result of their decisions), and may also face local demand shifters, generating heterogeneity in
the term pichaich . We take a different approach below.
4.2 Supply side
Given the CES preferences structure within each sector, firms face a constant price elasticity, implying
a constant markup over marginal cost: pich =
σh
σh−1wichτoch, where τoch is an iceberg trade cost between
the origin country o and destination c, for varieties of product h, and wich is the unit cost of producing
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where the term Ech
P 1−σch
is the counterpart of market capacity in this model, while τ1−σhoch is the inverse of
trade freeness between o and c. We also assume a fixed cost of exporting to each market Cch. Profits




Sales depend on the perceived quality adjusted price σhσh−1
wich
aich
, which captures both demand and
supply side determinants. From now on, we label βich ≡ σh−1σh
aich
wich
, the inverse of this perceived quality
adjusted price, which captures the profitability of firm i in country c. We also label Ach ≡ EchP 1−σch
τ1−σoch ,
the market specific component of profitability in c from o, a term that summarizes both the impact
of market capacity and trade freeness. We thus rewrite sales and profits as:










In this class of models, the key for firm decisions is the value of βich, which can explain differences in
firm productivity, the quality of the product or differences in preferences in destination c. It is often
either exogenously given or is the outcome of investments by firms. The country dimension may or
may not be present. Here, we do not take a stance on the source of heterogeneity behind βich across
firms. We assume that some firms are more profitable than others (with larger βs), but this will





. Firms can draw a β in their own distribution for each potential
destination market.
Definition 1. The distribution of firm n dominates the distribution of firm m in terms of hazard rate
order (HRSD), Fn (β)
hr
≻ Fm (β), if fn(β)1−Fn(β) ≤
fm(β)
1−Fm(β) , ∀β.
We assume that firms’ distributions can be ranked according to hazard rate stochastic order.
Corollary 1. For any increasing function y (x), En [y (x) | x > x] > Em [y (x) | x > x]
Hazard rate stochastic dominance (HRSD) allows a ranking of the conditional expectations of an
increasing function above some cutoff level. Thus, HRSD preserves first and second order stochastic
dominance for truncated distributions. Put differently, we define a better firm as having a higher
expected β, with a lower variance in the draw, regardless of the level of truncation.
Market cutoff and expected profits
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In order to export product h to country c, a firm needs to draw a β above the minimum cutoff













Note that this cutoff is independent of the distribution, it is only market specific. Expected profits of
firm i in market ch are thus given by:






ich − Cch | βich ≥ βch
]
(11)
Given Corollary 1, firms having distributions of higher hazard rate order (i.e. firms with a better
HRSD rank) have larger expected profits in each market.
4.4 Export decision
We consider the set of active firms in the origin country. Each firm i is endowed with a profitability
distribution Fi (β), and firms are ordered such that i is increasing in the HRSD rank. To export, firms
have two options. First, they can pay the sunk cost SX that allows them to export directly: this gives
them the possibility to draw their profitability parameter βich in each destination market. When a
draw is successful, i.e. above βch, firms pay the fixed export cost Cch associated with this destination
and export. If the draw is unsuccessful, they give up exporting to that destination. Note that this
implies an imperfect sorting of firms across markets.
Alternatively, firms may choose to pay the sunk cost SI . This allows them to match with a direct
exporter, i.e. a firm that has paid SX , in turn allowing them to use the export network of the exporter
to draw their profitability parameter in each destination market.17 The profits from successful draws
are then split via Nash bargaining, where a share α is going to the indirect exporter while a share
(1− α) is going to the actual exporter.
Matching
We deliberately choose to model the matching between direct and indirect exporters as simple as
possible for two reasons. First, we do not observe indirect exporters in the data, so we cannot assess
the bilateral specificities of the relationship. Second, our objective is to show how to generate the
pattern of elasticities we uncover in Section 3 in a model also compatible with the other stylized facts
we document. For this, we only need a sorting of firms between direct and indirect exporters based
on their HRSD rank. We therefore go for the simplest matching process that delivers this sorting.
Firms decide whether to pay SX and act as direct exporters, or to pay SI and match with a
direct exporter, or do not export. The identity of the direct exporter does not matter for the indirect
exporter as they provide identical export networks. Indirect exporters thus randomly choose a firm
that has paid SX and the match occurs. As they are chosen randomly, all direct exporters have the
17As such, the model is closer to the literature viewing intermediaries as providing an export network to indirect
exporters, as for example in Rauch and Watson (2004). Compared to them, we allow producers to use their network for
themselves and for other firms.
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same probability to match with each indirect exporter. The expected profits from intermediation for
the direct exporter are labeled E [ΠI ]. This depends on the relative number of firms that have paid SI
and SX , as well as the HRSD rank of indirect exporters. For simplicity, we assume there are enough
firms such that each firm does not take into account the impact of its own choice on E [ΠI ]. We also
assume that firms’ export choices do not affect aggregate conditions in each export market.18 Note
that we could assume that E [ΠI ] is an increasing function of the rank of the direct exporter, in line
with the empirical evidence that the best firms have more sourced products (Bernard et al., 2019).
As long as E [ΠI ] is not decreasing in the rank of the direct exporter, our results carry through. To
sum up, firms compare the following three options:
Status Expected profits
exporting directly πXDi =
∑
c∈C Ei [πich (βich)] + E [ΠI ]− SX
exporting indirectly πXIi = α
∑
c∈C Ei [πich (βich)]− SI
not exporting 0
When firms compare profits from exporting directly or indirectly, we get:
πXDi ≥ πXIi ⇔
∑
c∈C Ei [πich (βich)] ≥
SX−E[ΠI ]−SI
(1−α)
The coexistence of direct and indirect exporters depends on the value of α. If α is too low, no firm
would choose to export indirectly as they would not recover the sunk cost SI . Similarly, if α is too
high, profits from indirect exports always dominate the one from direct exporting. This is also true if
SX − E [ΠI ]− SI < 0. We thus assume that SX − E [ΠI ]− SI > 0 and α ∈ (αmin, αmax), such that we
have the joint presence of direct and indirect exporters, in line with empirical evidence. It follows:
Lemma 1. (Sorting) Let FXD (β) be the lowest ranked distribution for which firms pay the export
sunk cost SX . For any Fk>XD (β), firms pay the export sunk cost SX . For any Fj<XD (β), firms do
not pay the export sunk cost SX .
Proof : This is a direct application of Corollary 1, which implies that
∑
c∈C Ei [πich (aich)] is increasing
in firms’ HRSD rank.
The model generates a prediction that is very similar to what already exists in the literature on
trade intermediation. The best firms export directly, the least efficient firms do not export and firms
in between may export indirectly, taking advantage of the presence of intermediaries (e.g. Ahn et al.,
2011). There are two key differences. First, in our model, the direct manufacturing exporters are the
intermediaries. As a consequence, the “technology” to export used by intermediaries is the same as for
the direct exporters; there is no informational or technological advantage that leads to intermediation
by producers. The second important difference is the way we define firm profitability.
18In particular, we abstract from potential cannibalization effects between produced and sourced products (see (Eckel
and Riezman, 2020) for a discussion.
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4.5 Trade patterns
In this section, we compute trade flows from the origin o and show how they react to gravity deter-





In the following, it will be convenient to express the expected firm sales as the firm sales conditional
on exporting, weighted by the probability of making a good enough draw to export:
Ei [xich] = Pi (xich > 0)Ei [xich | xich ≥ 0] (13)
The probability of exporting to a given market for firm i is given by the probability of drawing
βich ≥ βch:









This probability depends on market conditions in the destination: trade costs and competition/market







Expected firm sales conditional on exporting are the expected sales conditional on βich ≥ βch:







Note that these expressions hold for direct and indirect exporters. As such, there is a slight abuse of
notation since, in the data, exports by indirect exporters are actually done by direct exporters. We
can, however, consider them as two different flows (two different i’s) as we do in our empirical analysis.
Note also that, in line with empirical evidence, expected sales, conditional on exporting, are larger for




First, note that the elasticity of aggregate trade to Ach is the sum of the elasticities of firms’










is the (expected) market share of firm i among exporters from the same origin
in market ch. The elasticity of aggregate trade is thus driven by the unconditional elasticity of each
exporter.
The firm level elasticity, unconditional on exporting, is given by:
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βσh−1ich | βich ≥ βch
] (17)
It follows:
Proposition 1. Aggregate elasticities are: (i) increased by uncertainty in β, and (ii) lower for flows
of direct exports compared to flows of indirect exports.
Proof : see Appendix A.1.
This expression is strictly decreasing in the HRSD rank of the firm, and larger than 1, which
corresponds to the case where there is no uncertainty in βich. As firms sort themselves according
to their HRSD rank, all firms selling indirectly have a lower rank and thus a larger unconditional
elasticity. Aggregate elasticities being a weighted sum of the firm level elasticities, they inherit their
properties.
Aggregate elasticities are increased by the presence of uncertainty in β because an increase in βch
not only forces firms to exit at the margin but along the whole distribution. This increase is smaller for
flows of direct exports because of the lower hazard rate of better distributions. Elasticities are larger
for indirect exporters because these exporters tend to exit more when markets become more difficult
to reach, either because they are more costly to access or because they are smaller/more competitive.
This matches the result found in Section 3 where we show that the larger aggregate elasticity of
indirect exports is driven by a larger exit of firms. The model thus shows how aggregate indirect
exports react more strongly to gravity determinants while being exported with the same information
set and technology as aggregate direct exports. Note also that in this framework, these goods are
similar in all ways to those directly exported, and in particular, the demand elasticity is the same.
Firm level trade
Empirically, the firm level elasticities we have found are elasticities conditional on exporting. Firm
level exports, conditional on exporting, are given by:



















βσ−1ich | βich ≥ βch
]) (19)
It follows:
Proposition 2. Firm level elasticities are lowered by uncertainty in β.
Proof : see Appendix A.2.
21
Without uncertainty in βich, we would get εEn[xich|xich≥0]⧸Ach = 1. These elasticities are thus







< 0: as firms move to more difficult
markets, they need better draws in βich, implying a larger expected βich, conditional on exporting.
Put differently, the increase of Ei
[
βσh−1ich | βich ≥ βch
]
makes firms relatively better sellers, conditional
on exporting.
Furthermore, the above expression generates larger firm level elasticities for higher ranked firms,
as in the data, for many functional forms of f(β), including the Pareto distribution.19
Finally, the gap between the conditional and the unconditional elasticity is given by:










Proposition 3. The difference between the conditional and the unconditional elasticity increases for
firms with lower HRSD rank (elasticity divergence).
This difference is the elasticity of the probability of exporting, as the difference between conditional
and unconditional expected exports is simply the probability of exporting; see equations (13) and (18).
By definition of HRSD, it is decreasing in the rank of the firm.
The gap between the conditional and the unconditional elasticities is thus larger for indirect ex-
porters, in line with our empirical results (as the unconditional elasticity drives the aggregate one). As
Ach decreases (more difficult markets), βch increases and relatively more indirect exporters are forced
to exit at the margin. An increase in βch thus transfers more probability mass towards higher values
of possible βch for indirect exporters. This result shows that in this model, observed firm performance
does not fully determine the pattern of entry/exit. In other words, the causality from observed prof-
itability to the probability of exporting is not perfect. The uncertainty about βch, which is correlated
across markets, can thus explain the pattern of elasticities we find in the data.
Note that in the standard model without any uncertainty (i.e. with β constant across destinations),
these two elasticities are equal, except for firms at the margin (those that exit). If i.i.d. shocks are
present, the probability of exporting to the next market will be different than 0 or 1. This probability
then depends on the profitability of the firm. For the most productive firms, only large shocks may
force them to exit.20 The probability of exit is thus moving together with the profitability of the firm.
Thus, this class of models cannot generate the elasticity divergence we observe.
19Suppose β is drawn from a Pareto distribution over (0, 1), with a shape parameter α > 1: Fα (β) = β
α. A larger α

























which is increasing in α.
20See for example Bernard et al. (2011) and Eaton et al. (2011).
22
It is also possible to get endogenous firm level conditional elasticities, for example in the presence
of a non-constant demand elasticity. However, assuming that demand becomes more elastic moving up
the demand curve (i.e. assuming Marshall’s second law of demand, which has large empirical support),
larger/better firms would have a lower conditional elasticity. No matter the case considered, if sales
decline less for some firms, we expect them to have a larger probability to continue exporting. It is
thus not simple to find a rationale for the pattern we find in the data with existing models.
Finally, our model is consistent with the other stylized facts we document. In particular, the model
predicts lower export flows for sourced products and the presence of PI flows arises naturally.
4.6 Testing the model’s mechanism
The model provides a rationale for the pattern we find in the data. The mechanism generating this
result is tied to the assumption that firm profitability is stochastic across markets and can be ordered
across firms by hazard rate stochastic ordering (HRSD). Here, we check whether the data are consistent
with this key assumption and thus support the mechanism put forward in the model.
While we cannot directly observe the distributions Fi (β), we can recover the realizations across
markets for each firm-product pair. In turn, we can compare them for each product between sourced
and produced exports. Note that these distributions are firm-product specific.21 Realizations, on
the other hand, are firm-product-destination-year specific. Hence, we run the following regression to
isolate the firm-product specific component of sales:
xicht = FEiht + FEcht + FEict + FEich + ϵicht (21)
Compared to equation (6), we add FEich, to ensure that FEiht captures solely the firm-product-year
dimension of sales. For robustness and to make it more comparable with our previous results, we also
run equation (21) without the last set of fixed effects FEich. Thus, FEiht provides an estimate of the
mean of Fi (β) for each firm-product pair, and FEiht + ϵicht provides an estimate of the realizations
of the draws in Fi (β) by firm i for product h in country c, i.e. estimates of each βich at time t.
One key implication of HRSD is that it preserves first and second order stochastic dominance for
truncated distributions (see Corollary 1). It follows that, in each market, sales of sourced products
have a lower mean and a larger variance, compared to produced products.22 The lower mean leads
sales of sourced products to be smaller and less profitable. Hence, they tend to exit more when moving
to the next, more difficult market. The larger variance leads sales of sourced products, in each market,
to also be more dispersed, i.e. sales of sourced products are more “risky.” When moving to the next
market, it implies that, conditional on the mean, the probability to make better draws is also larger,
21In the model, we assume for simplicity that these distributions are stable over time. However, our results would also
hold if we let these distributions evolve over time, as long as their ranking is left unaffected. To take into account this
possibility, we also control for the time dimension in our sets of fixed effects.
22Formally, Corollary 1 implies that if Fn (β)
hr
≻ Fm (β), then En
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in turn generating a relatively lower reaction of their sales, conditional on exporting. Therefore, we
want to test here whether these two properties of HRSD that are driving our theoretical results do
appear in the data.
We first collect FEiht for each firm-product pair. Then, for a given product, we compare the mean
of FEiht in each market for produced and sourced flows, i.e. Emcht [FEiht], with m = {P, S} (produced,
sourced). We test for the following condition:
EPcht [FEiht] > EScht [FEiht] , ∀ cht
Second, we collect ϵicht for each firm-product pair. Then, for a given product, we compare the variance
of ϵicht in each market for produced and sourced flows, i.e. Vmcht [ϵicht], with m = {P, S}. Thus, we
check whether:
VScht [ϵicht] > VPcht [ϵicht] , ∀ cht
To have meaningful estimations, we restrict our sample to markets where we have at least five obser-
vations, per market-year, of produced and of sourced flows for a given product h. For robustness, we
further restrict the sample to have at least 10 observations of each.
Table 8 panel (a) shows the results with minimum five observations, and panel (b) shows the
corresponding results with minimum 10 observations. Note that we include cht fixed effects in all
regressions. Hence, we compare the mean and the variance of produced and sourced flows for a given
product, in the same markets and years, as required by the model. Column 1 regresses FEiht that is
obtained from a first-stage regression with cht, iht, ict, and ich fixed effects, i.e. from equation (21),
on a dummy that indicates whether the flows are sourced, and finds that FEiht, capturing the mean of
Fi (β), is significantly lower for sourced products. Column 2 uses FEiht estimated from the first-stage
regression without ich fixed effects and finds a similar coefficient.
In column 3 of Table 8, we regress the within product-market variance of residuals that are esti-
mated from the first-stage regression (equation (21)) with the most restrictive fixed effects, and find
that these variances are larger for sourced products when compared to produced products. Column
4 uses residuals from the less restrictive first-stage regression, and confirms the higher variability of
sourced flows within a given market. In panel (b), to make sure that fixed effects and residuals are
estimated with enough variation, we restrict the sample to mcht with at least 10 observations. The
results corroborate the findings of panel (a). These results indicate that sourced exports are both
less profitable and more risky. On average, this pattern is true across markets (and thus no matter
the truncation of Fih (β)), which thus provides evidence of the model’s mechanism that explains the
pattern of elasticities we find in the data.
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Table 8: Testing for the model’s mechanism
Dependent variable: Emcht [FEiht] Vmcht [ϵicht]
(a) ≥ 5 obs. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sourcedm -0.816*** -0.969*** 0.036*** 0.080***








FE cht cht cht cht
N 23,453 45,199 23,453 45,199
R2 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.90
(b) ≥ 10 obs. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sourcedm -0.913*** -0.947*** 0.064*** 0.105***








FE cht cht cht cht
N 5,422 11,708 5,422 11,708
R2 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.91
Notes: Emcht [FEiht] is the mean of the estimated FEiht for m = P, S; Vmcht [ϵicht] is the
variance of the estimated residuals ϵicht. Sourcedm is dummy variable that indicates whether
the export flow m is sourced as opposed to produced. Panel (a) restricts the sample to mcht
with at least 5 observations, and panel (b) restricts the sample to mcht with at least 10
observations. Columns 1 and 3 use estimates obtained from a first-stage regression with
cht, iht, ict, and ich fixed effects, whereas columns 2 and 4 use estimates obtained from
a first-stage regression with cht, iht, and ict fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
respectively.
5 TIP, CAT, and TII
In this final section, we discuss two issues raised by our results. First, the literature has suggested
that trade intermediation by producers is driven by complementarities between exports of produced
goods and sourced goods (e.g. Bernard et al., 2019; Eckel and Riezman, 2020). Our model, on the
other hand, does not include complementarities between these flows and is thus uninformative about
them. In Section 5.1, we propose a simple test to see whether these possible complementarities also
appear in our data. Second, we have shown that producers act as trade intermediaries. Hence, it
seems natural to ask whether there is a difference between this trade of sourced products and the
trade done by professional (non-manufacturing) intermediaries. Therefore, in Section 5.2, we compare
trade intermediation by producers (TIP) to trade intermediation by professional intermediaries (TII).
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5.1 TIP: is it about intermediation only?
Our model does not incorporate complementarities between exports of sourced and produced products.
This is first motivated by the fact that the gravity pattern remains when we look at PI exports. This
result implies that these complementarities, if present, are not driving the difference in elasticities we
find. However, this does not mean that they are not present in our data. Here, we do not assess what
type of complementarities could be present, but provide a clear indication that there are some.23 To do
so, we take advantage of the presence of PI flows for which such possible complementarities cannot be
present by definition. Note that this is a new approach to provide evidence for these complementarities,
as we focus on trade of sourced products and not of produced products, in contrast to what has been
done in the literature (e.g. Bernard et al., 2019; Arnarson, 2020).
The idea is simple: if there are some complementarities, they may appear for flows of sourced
products when exported together with produced products, and not when exported alone. These
complementarities should generate additional gains that would make it possible to profitably export
less of the sourced product. In terms of our model, it should lower βch; for a given sourced product,
each destination becomes easier to access when bundled with a produced product. By definition, this
cannot be the case for a PI flow.
We thus plot firm-level export flows for each HS section and for each of the eight main regions of
the world. We first compare sourced exports to produced exports as decomposed in equation (2). We
then split sourced exports into CAT exports (for which complementarities may be present) and PI
exports as in (3). Figure 1 depicts the histogram for the main HS section (Textiles and Apparel), and
Figure 2 depicts it for the top regional destination of Turkish exports (Europe).
Panels (a) of Figures 1 and 2 show that, as expected, exports of sourced products (transparent bars)
are on average lower than produced exports (shaded bars). More importantly, panels (b) illustrate
that PI exports are on average larger than CAT exports. This is what the model would predict if βch
is lowered for CAT exports across destinations compared to PI exports. This pattern holds true for all
HS sections and destinations (see Appendix Figures B.1 and B.2). We interpret this systematic pattern
as suggestive evidence of some positive complementarities between exports of sourced and produced
products. These complementarities make smaller exports of sourced products profitable when exported
together with a produced product. When firms cannot take advantage of these complementarities,
they need to export on average more of the sourced product. While our main results support the view
that accessing export markets generates gains for firms beyond the increased market size for their
own products as they also act as intermediaries, this last result suggests that firms may additionally
benefit from complementarities between sourced and produced products when possible.
23Bernard et al. (2019) discuss in detail the various possible complementarities that can be at work.
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Figure 1: Distribution of flows for Textiles and apparel
(a) Produced vs. sourced (b) CAT vs. PI
Notes: Panel (a) shows the histogram of produced (shaded bars) versus sourced (transparent bars) export
flows. Panel (b) shows the histogram of CAT (shaded bars) versus PI (transparent bars) export flows.
Exports are in logs (lne). The sample includes exports of products in the Textiles and apparel sector in
2010.
Figure 2: Distribution of flows to Europe
(a) Produced vs. sourced (b) CAT vs. PI
Notes: Panel (a) shows the histogram of produced (shaded bars) versus sourced (transparent bars) export
flows. Panel (b) shows the histogram of CAT (shaded bars) versus PI (transparent bars) export flows.
Exports are in logs (lne). The sample includes exports to Europe in 2010.
5.2 Comparing TIP and TII
The literature that compares the behaviour of professional intermediaries to manufacturing exporters
mainly shows that intermediaries facilitate international trade in two ways.24 First, intermediaries
export goods produced by firms that are not productive enough to export directly, thus allowing
more goods to be exported. This is also the case in our model as exports of sourced products have
a lower HRSD rank. Second, intermediaries have a comparative advantage in exporting due to some
specific market knowledge, information and/or technological advantage. They are thus able to alle-
viate the difficulty of reaching less-accessible markets.25 By definition, this type of technological or
24See, for example, Bernard et al. (2010), Blum et al. (2010), Ahn et al. (2011), Crozet et al. (2013), Bernard et al.
(2015), and Akerman (2018).
25Typically, it has been shown that the share of aggregate exports by intermediaries tends to rise with various measures
of destination specific fixed/sunk costs of exporting.
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informational advantage cannot be present when we compare exports of produced and sourced goods
by manufacturers, as the exporters are the same firms. As we show below, we also find suggestive
evidence for this comparative advantage of intermediaries in our data.
Table 9: Results with professional intermediaries
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: lnXmcht ln avgmcht lnnomcht
Sourcedm -0.662*** -0.771*** 0.109***
(0.059) (0.049) (0.024)
Inter.m -0.741*** -0.708*** -0.034
(0.068) (0.059) (0.028)
MCcHt 0.094*** 0.007 0.087***
× Sourcedm (0.021) (0.015) (0.017)
MCcHt -0.078** -0.057** -0.021
× Inter.m (0.031) (0.026) (0.017)
FTcHt 0.105*** -0.005 0.111***
× Sourcedm (0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
FTcHt 0.103*** -0.010 0.113***
× Inter.m (0.039) (0.023) (0.025)
FE cht cht cht
N 1,340,628 1,340,628 1,340,628
R2 0.81 0.81 0.78
Notes: lnXmcht is log export values, ln avgmcht is log average exports per firm, and lnnomcht is
the log number of exporters at the country-HS6-year (cht) level. Sourcedm is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the export flow m is sourced as opposed to produced. Interm is a dummy
variable that indicates whether the export flow m is done by professional intermediaries. MCcHt
and FTcHt refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year level (cHt)
respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
We follow the same empirical strategy as before to compare TIP and TII, estimating a gravity
equation at the aggregate (product) level to directly compare our results to the literature. In contrast
to previous literature though, we compare exports by professional intermediaries to the two export
flows of producers (sourced and produced), for the same good sold to the same destination. To do so,
we now add to our dataset the exports of professional intermediaries.26
Table 9 shows the results of estimating specification (5) including professional intermediaries. First,
column 1 shows that the interactions with the sourced dummy are virtually unchanged compared to
our baseline, providing another robustness check to our main result. The interactions of FT with the
intermediary dummy and the sourced dummy are similar – both TIP and TII react more strongly to
trade freeness than flows of produced goods. However, the interaction of the intermediary dummy
with MC is negative and significant at the 5% level; exports by intermediaries react even less to MC
than produced exports. This result confirms what has been found in the literature. A low market
26Professional intermediaries are defined as in footnote 2.
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capacity captures various hurdles to trade with this country. Some specific knowledge or information
associated with this country may therefore be particularly important to sell there. As market capacity
gets lower, such specific knowledge becomes relatively more important to export. Columns 2 and 3
show the corresponding results for average exports and number of exporters respectively.
In Table 10, we run two alternative specifications. We first run our specification bundling the
exports of sourced and produced products together, thus comparing trade by manufacturers to trade
by intermediaries (TII), to make our results directly comparable with the literature. Second, we
bundle trade by intermediaries and sourced exports together, to compare trade of direct exports to
trade of indirect exports (i.e. TIP+TII).
Table 10: Results with bundled flows
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: lnXmcht lnXmcht
Inter.m -0.587***
(0.054)
MCcHt × Inter.m -0.253***
(0.033)




MCcHt × Sourcedm 0.103***
(0.023)





Notes: lnXmcht is log export values at the country-HS6-year (cht) level. Interm is
dummy variable that indicates whether the export flow m is done by professional
intermediaries as opposed to producers. Sourcedm is dummy variable that indicates
whether the export flow m is sourced as opposed to produced, and it includes both
sourced exports of manufacturers and professional intermediaries. MCcHt and FTcHt
refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year level (cHt)
respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Table 10 column 1 shows that when we compare manufacturers with professional intermediaries,
we get similar results to what has been shown in the literature: intermediaries react less to MC
and FT than producers do (although the coefficient for the latter is not statistically significant). In
contrast, when we compare direct trade to intermediated trade in column 2, we get the opposite
result: intermediated trade reacts more to MC and FT . Put differently, there is a difference between
intermediated trade and trade by intermediaries. This is driven by the difference between TIP and
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TII: exports that are intermediated by manufacturers are more sensitive to gravity determinants and
therefore more present in easily accessible markets – which is also in line with the fact that these goods
are less profitable – while professional intermediaries seem to have more specific market knowledge
to export. A comparison between producers and professional intermediaries may thus be misleading
about the characteristics of intermediated trade.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have first confirmed that manufacturing exporters also export sourced products.
This phenomenon is ubiquitous across firms, products and destinations. Taking this intermediation
by producers into account leads to more than double the amount of aggregate exports of Turkey
that is intermediated. We further document that, to many destinations, producers ship only sourced
products, engaging in pure intermediation (PI). We then show that this trade is more sensitive to
gravity determinants at the aggregate level, but it is less sensitive at the firm level, conditional on
exporting, what we refer to as an elasticity divergence. We take advantage of the presence of PI
exports to show that this striking pattern cannot be explained by complementarities between exports
of produced and sourced products.
We then develop a model to rationalize the data. Beyond allowing producers to act as interme-
diaries, the key novel feature of the model is that profitability in each destination is stochastic and
these shocks are correlated across markets, thus affecting firms’ pattern of entry and exit. We further
provide empirical evidence in favor of the model’s core mechanism. In the last part of the paper, we
compare PI flows to CAT flows and find suggestive evidence for complementarities between exports of
produced and sourced products. Finally, we highlight the different behavior of trade intermediation
by producers (TIP) compared to trade intermediation by professional intermediaries (TII).
The different reaction of sourced exports to gravity determinants is important because it points to
a specific selection mechanism and it implies that sourced exports matter for the pattern of aggregate
trade. It also shows that TIP is not a statistical artifact, driven by misclassification of product codes
or inaccurate concordance procedures. Overall, our results imply that building an export network can
generate gains for firms beyond having access to a larger market for their products. It allows them
to reap further benefits through intermediation and potential complementarities between sourced and
produced exports.
We have left two important questions aside for future research. First, we remain silent about
the determinants of the match between a direct exporter and an indirect exporter. Yet, the data
suggest that there is heterogeneity among manufacturing exporters regarding how much they engage
in sourced exporting. Second, we abstract from the export dynamics of sourced products. Are they
introduced first in some specific destinations, together or not with produced products? How much of
firms’ export growth is driven by sourced exports? These types of questions are key to understand
the selection and dynamics of firms in export markets.
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A Theoretical appendix
A.1 Computation of the aggregate elasticity


















































We obtain the expression in the text:


















βσh−1ich | βich ≥ βch
]
By definition of HRSD,
fi(βch)
1−Fi(βch)
is lower for firms with a higher HRSD rank. Similarly for those
firms, Ei
[
βσh−1ich | βich ≥ βch
]
is larger (see Corollary 1), implying lower unconditional elasticity for
firms with higher HRSD rank.
A.2 Computation of the firm level elasticity
We have:
Ei [xich | xich ≥ 0] = AchEi
[
βσh−1ich | βich ≥ βch
]
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The elasticity of expected firm sales, conditional on exporting is given by:

















































































βσ−1ich | βich ≥ βch
])
By definition of HRSD,
fi(βch)
1−Fi(βch)
is lower for firms with a higher HRSD rank, which would imply
larger elasticity for those firms. However, Ei
[
βσh−1ich | βich ≥ βch
]
is larger for these firms (see Corollary




dominates, as for example with the Pareto example we gave in the text, implying larger
conditional elasticity for firms with higher HRSD rank.
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B Empirical appendix
B.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Table B.1 shows examples of firms that engage in sourced exporting and their products ranked by
sales.27 For instance, a large manufacturer of motor vehicles produced four HS4+ products in 2010:
buses, lorries, trailers, and passenger cars. However, it exported 64 HS4+ products, 62 of which
were not produced by this firm. These sourced products consisted mostly of inputs such as motor
vehicle bodies, safety glass, and new pneumatic tyres. The second example is a mid-sized manufacturer
of apparel that produces two different kinds of men’s shirts, but exports only one of them, alongside
other exported products such as women’s blouses and shirts. The third example is a small manufacturer
of textiles that produces woven fabrics of carded wool that it does not export, and instead, it exports
carpets and bedspreads.
Table B.1: Examples of sourced exporting firms
Product Produced Exported
Large manufacturer of motor vehicles
1. Buses Yes Yes
2. Lorries Yes Yes
3. Trailers Yes No
4. Passenger cars Yes No
5. Motor vehicle bodies No Yes
6. Safety glass No Yes
7. New pneumatic tyres No Yes
...
Mid-sized manufacturer of apparel
1. Men’s shirts (not knitted or crocheted) Yes Yes
2. Men’s shirts (knitted or crocheted) Yes No
3. Women’s blouses and shirts No Yes
Small manufacturer of textiles
1. Woven fabrics of carded wool Yes No
2. Carpets and other textile floor-coverings No Yes
3. Bedspreads and textile wall-coverings No Yes
...
Notes: The size of the firm is based on its number of employees. Products are
identified at the HS4+ level, and are ranked according to sales. ... indicates that the
firms export more products but we omit them in the table for brevity.
27This table does not include exhaustive information about the firms due to confidentiality reasons.
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Table B.2: Trade versus production codes: Tyres
Trade codes:
HS 40 Rubber and articles thereof
HS 4011 New pneumatic tyres
HS 401110 For motor cars
HS 401120 For buses
HS 401130 For aircraft
HS 401140 For motorcycles
HS 401150 For bicycles
...
Production codes:
NACE 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
NACE 2211 Rubber tyres and tubes
CPA 221111 New pneumatic tyres for motor cars
CPA 221112 New pneumatic tyres for motorcycles and bicycles
CPA 221113 New pneumatic tyres for buses, lorries, and aircraft
PROD 22111355 For buses or lorries with a load index <= 121
PROD 22111357 For buses or lorries with a load index > 121
PROD 22111370 For aircraft
...
Notes: Trade codes are based on the international Harmonized Schedule (HS) system,
and production codes are based on the PRODCOM system of the EU.
Table B.3: Aggregate statistics - conservative definition









2005 36.7% 27.5% 24.8% 32.3%
2006 33.7% 29.9% 23.0% 31.7%
2007 35.9% 26.1% 26.4% 26.3%
2008 34.6% 29.5% 26.3% 24.0%
2009 35.8% 25.3% 29.2% 18.3%
2010 38.3% 28.4% 30.0% 21.8%
2011 36.7% 29.0% 27.6% 24.9%
2012 38.3% 30.2% 28.3% 26.1%
2013 38.8% 30.7% 27.6% 28.9%
2014 40.1% 35.9% 27.5% 31.3%
Notes: Manu. exports refer to the exports of manufacturing firms. TIP refers to trade
intermediation by producers as defined in equation (2). TII refers to trade interme-
diation by professional (non-manufacturing) intermediaries as defined in equation (1).
PI refers to the purely intermediated portion of TIP as defined in equation (3). Total
exports is the sum of manufacturing and TII exports. Sourced product is defined to
be not produced by the firm in 2005-2014. Purely intermediated exports are sales to
destinations that the firm has not sold a produced product in 2005-2014.
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Table B.4: Top 10 HS2 sectors and destinations









87 Vehicles $ 9,262 99.2% 46.0% 27.3%










$ 5,244 64.2% 57.0% 35.7%
61
Articles of apparel and
clothing accessories,
knitted or crocheted
$ 3,148 63.2% 53.1% 14.4%




$ 2,095 88.5% 40.8% 50.8%
62
Articles of apparel and
clothing accessories, not
knitted or crocheted








$ 1,326 73.4% 80.8% 56.0%









Germany $ 6,392 84.9% 41.0% 35.3%
UK $ 4,465 74.5% 37.4% 50.0%
Italy $ 4,105 86.3% 57.3% 17.2%
France $ 3,232 78.1% 46.6% 27.4%
Spain $ 2,476 75.6% 46.0% 47.2%
USA $ 2,265 89.6% 37.2% 30.0%
Iraq $ 2,208 67.9% 47.4% 34.4%
Russia $ 2,002 79.4% 38.7% 58.7%
United Arab Emirates $ 1,823 90.8% 20.3% 52.7%
Iran $ 1,579 76.7% 46.3% 44.1%
Notes: Statistics are based on Turkey’s exports of $59 billion represented by the sample of producers and
intermediaries in our sample in 2010. TIP refers to trade intermediation by producers as defined in equation
(2). PI refers to the purely intermediated portion of TIP as defined in equation (3). Total exports is the
sum of manufacturing and professional intermediary exports. Sectors and countries are ranked according
to export values as indicated in column 1.
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B.2 Additional summary statistics and robustness checks
Table B.5: Summary statistics for the benchmark regressions
Aggregate Firm-level
Variable Mean Sd. Mean Sd.
Sourcedm, Sourcediht 0.68 0.47 0.73 0.45
MCcHt 8.13 1.90 8.53 1.92
FTcHt 1.39 1.49 1.80 1.44
Notes: Summary statistics are for the benchmark aggregate and
firm-level results in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. For aggregate
regressions, Sourcedm is dummy variable that indicates whether
the export flow m is sourced as opposed to produced. For firm-
level regressions, Sourcediht is a dummy variable that indicates
whether the export flow of firm i of product h in year t is sourced
as opposed to produced. MCcHt and FTcHt refer to market
capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year (cHt)
level respectively.
Table B.6: Aggregate results - with HS4 MCcHt and FTcHt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: lnXmcht lnXmcht ln avgmcht lnnomcht
Sourcedm -0.526*** -0.602*** -0.848*** 0.246***
(0.040) (0.053) (0.043) (0.028)
MCcHt 0.464***
(0.025)
× Sourcedm 0.056** 0.071** 0.005 0.066***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.017) (0.025)
FTcHt 0.440***
(0.018)
× Sourcedm 0.045*** 0.082*** -0.012 0.094***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015)
FE ch, ct, ht cht cht cht
N 875,221 875,221 875,221 875,221
R2 0.69 0.89 0.89 0.87
Notes: lnXmcht is log export values, ln avgmcht is log average exports per firm, and
lnnomcht is the log number of exporters at the country-HS6-year (cht) level. Sourcedm
is dummy variable that indicates whether the export flow m is sourced as opposed to
produced. MCcHt and FTcHt refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the
country-HS4-year level (cHt) respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and
HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels respectively.
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Table B.7: Aggregate results - excluding the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: lnXmcht lnXmcht ln avgmcht lnnomcht
Sourcedm -0.660*** -0.733*** -0.846*** 0.113***
(0.050) (0.067) (0.056) (0.026)
MCcHt 0.372***
(0.031)
× Sourcedm 0.061*** 0.087*** 0.016 0.071***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
FTcHt 0.286***
(0.024)
× Sourcedm 0.091*** 0.129*** -0.006 0.134***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014)
FE ch, ct, ht cht cht cht
N 585,721 585,721 585,721 585,721
R2 0.70 0.91 0.91 0.86
Notes: lnXmcht is log export values, ln avgmcht is log average exports per firm, and
lnnomcht is the log number of exporters at the country-HS6-year (cht) level. Sourcedm
is dummy variable that indicates whether the export flow m is sourced as opposed to
produced. MCcHt and FTcHt refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the
country-HS2-year level (cHt) respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and
HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels respectively.
Table B.8: Aggregate results - PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Xmcht Xmcht avgmcht nomcht
Sourcedm -0.590*** -0.719*** -0.902*** 0.223***
(0.192) (0.244) (0.302) (0.051)
MCcHt 0.648***
(0.077)
× Sourcedm 0.008 0.032 -0.033 0.056*
(0.047) (0.057) (0.073) (0.030)
FTcHt 0.733***
(0.045)
× Sourcedm -0.016 0.003 0.020 0.122***
(0.049) (0.052) (0.111) (0.018)
FE ch, ct, ht cht cht cht
N 585,721 585,721 585,721 585,721
pseudo-R2 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.49
Notes: Xmcht is the value of exports in US $, avgmcht is the average exports per firm,
and nomcht is the number of exporters at the country-HS6-year (cht) level. Sourcedm
is dummy variable that indicates whether the export flow m is sourced as opposed to
produced. MCcHt and FTcHt refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the
country-HS2-year level (cHt) respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and
HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels respectively.
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Table B.9: Results with GDP and distance
(1) (2)
Aggregate Firm-level
Dependent variable: lnXmcht lnxicht
Sourcedm -0.580
(0.429)
ln(GDP )ct × Sourcedm 0.059***
(0.018)
ln(distance)c × Sourcedm -0.184***
(0.037)
ln(GDP )ct × Sourcediht -0.059***
(0.006)
ln(distance)c × Sourcediht 0.110***
(0.016)
FE cht cht, iht, ict
N 881,946 2,092,184
R2 0.89 0.96
Notes: lnXmcht is log export values at the country-HS6-year (cht)
level. Sourcedm is dummy variable that indicates whether the export
flow m is sourced as opposed to produced. lnxicht is export values at
the firm-country-HS6-year (icht) level. Sourcediht is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the export flow of firm i of product h in year
t is sourced as opposed to produced. Clustered standard errors (by
country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table B.10: Firm-level results - with HS4 MCcHt and FTcHt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: lnxicht lnxicht ln qicht ln qicht lnuvicht lnuvicht
Sourcediht -1.053*** -1.230*** 0.177***
(0.057) (0.070) (0.019)
MCcHt 0.284*** 0.274*** 0.010
(0.027) (0.030) (0.006)
× Sourcediht 0.014 -0.085*** 0.038 -0.086*** -0.024*** 0.001
(0.019) (0.009) (0.024) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002)
FTcHt 0.355*** 0.360*** -0.005
(0.035) (0.040) (0.006)
× Sourcediht -0.082*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.006 -0.002
(0.020) (0.008) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002)









N 2,087,740 2,087,740 2,087,740 2,087,740 2,087,740 2,087,740
R2 0.42 0.96 0.55 0.97 0.73 0.99
Notes: lnxicht is export values, ln qicht is export quantities, and lnuvicht is export unit values at the
firm-country-HS6-year (icht) level. Sourcediht is a dummy variable that indicates whether the export
flow of firm i of product h in year t is sourced as opposed to produced. MCcHt and FTcHt refer
to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS4-year (cHt) level respectively. Clustered
standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Table B.11: Firm-level results - excluding the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: lnxicht lnxicht ln qicht ln qicht lnuvicht lnuvicht
Sourcediht -0.904*** -1.070*** 0.165***
(0.049) (0.063) (0.022)
MCcHt 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.001
(0.019) (0.023) (0.011)
× Sourcediht -0.015 -0.090*** -0.001 -0.089*** -0.014 -0.002
(0.023) (0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.009) (0.003)
FTcHt 0.323*** 0.336*** -0.014**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.006)
× Sourcediht -0.127*** -0.087*** -0.137*** -0.084*** 0.010* -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003)









N 1,196,898 1,196,898 1,196,898 1,196,898 1,196,898 1,196,898
R2 0.48 0.98 0.62 0.98 0.75 0.99
Notes: lnxicht is export values, ln qicht is export quantities, and lnuvicht is export unit values at
the firm-country-HS6-year (icht) level. Sourcediht is a dummy variable that indicates whether
the export flow of firm i of product h in year t is sourced as opposed to produced. MCcHt
and FTcHt refer to market capacity and freeness of trade at the country-HS2-year (cHt) level
respectively. Clustered standard errors (by country and HS6) are in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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B.3 Distribution of trade flows by HS and region
Figure B.1: Distribution of flows by HS section: produced vs. sourced, CAT vs. PI
HS IV: Prepared foodstuffs HS VI: Chemicals
HS VII: Plastics and rubber HS VIII: Leather goods
HS IX-X: Wood and wood products HS XIII-XIV: Stones, ceramics, and glass
HS XV: Metals HS XVI: Machinery
HS XVII: Vehicles HS XVIII: Instruments
HS XX: Misc. manufacturing
Notes: The left panel of each section shows the histogram of produced (shaded bars) versus sourced
(transparent bars) export flows. The right panel of each section shows the histogram of CAT (shaded
bars) versus PI (transparent bars) export flows. Exports are in logs (lne). The sample includes exports
by producers in 2010.
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Figure B.2: Distribution of flows by region: produced vs. sourced, CAT vs. PI
East Asia and Pacific Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa North America
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
West and Central Asia
Notes: The left panel of each region shows the histogram of produced (shaded bars) versus sourced
(transparent bars) export flows. The right panel of each region shows the histogram of CAT (shaded
bars) versus PI (transparent bars) export flows. Exports are in logs (lne). The sample includes exports
by producers in 2010.
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